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ORIGINAL RESEARCH

Beyond Borders and Belonging: Chinese Illegal Migration and Diaspora as Distinct Forces in Shaping American Communities

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This research paper challenges the dichotomy between illegal migration and diaspora in Chinese transnationalism in the United States. Applying the theoretical frameworks in *Global Asias*, i.e., the idea of flexible citizenship provided by Aihwa Ong and analysis of Orientalism by John Kuo Wei Tchen, this paper compares the experiences of undocumented Fujianese migrants with those of the overall, legally constituted, Chinese diaspora. Although these groups are often simplified into a single, heterogeneous demographic of so-called Chinese Americans, each has unique motivations, economic realities, and processes of identity formation. It not only delves into the purpose of the goddess Mazu as a dual force in smuggling protection and cultural glue but also examines how American Orientalism confines the two groups, through space, in Chinatowns, and diverts them in their different directions to make them feel like part of something. Investigating the field of smuggling economics, religious networks, spatial politics, and digital transnationalism, this study introduces the underlying stratifications in Chinese America that resist monolithic accounts of immigrant assimilation.

The story of the Chinese immigration to the United States is often reduced to a one-line narrative of the "immigrant dream," a linear series of arrival and assimilation. Nevertheless, this unitary perspective masks the significant stratification of Chinese transnational mobility. The mobility of bodies across the Pacific in the modern period of *Global Asias* is characterized by a sharp divide between the mobile, capital-intensive, so-called, hyper-mobile, flexible citizenship of the overarching idea of the diaspora and the Survivalist, debt-based, and shadowy figure of the illegal migrant.

The argument presented in this paper highlights that Chinese illegal immigration and the Chinese diaspora are two opposite phenomena that have two different types of pressures on American society and American identity formation. To explain this divergence, we should first determine the terms of engagement. I would not conceive of *Global Asias* as a locked-up geographic unit, but rather as a mobile methodology—a means of tracing the shifting movement of people, capital, and ideas that resist the fixed boundaries of the nation-state. In the same vein, I understand the term diaspora in this instance not solely as a dispersed population but as a form of flexible belonging. This positionality enables the negotiation of identity across multiple locations. This paper, however, suggests that although the diaspora seeks a logic of flexible accumulation, at the risk of maintaining reasonable and desirable relations with the motherland, the illegal migrants, that is, the ones out of Fujian province, are seeking a shadow economy, where a logic of coercion and debt is the rule and regulation [13]. Despite the internal differences, both parties would need to maneuver through the external influences of the American Orientalism that has historically condemned the existence of the Chinese to some enclaves, including Chinatown.

Based on the study of the working mechanics of Fujianese smuggling, the spiritual servant of goddess Mazu, and the spatial politics of Chinatown, this study demonstrates how the legal category ultimately transforms the experience of the so-called Asian American. This stratification is critical to understanding the present-day Chinese American communities and to debunking the myth of the model minority and masking the realities of working-class Asian Americans.

Theoretical Framework: Migration vs. Diaspora in Global Asias

This stratification of Chinese mobility can be explained only if the difference between migration and diaspora is drawn. The terms are not exchangeable in *Global Asias*. Historians have long pointed out that the history of Asian labor and migration has been complex, as the coolie trade and later diasporic constructions have never been monolithic [7]. On this basis, these historians have inferred that the movement of migration is a response to an immediate economic or political necessity [11]. Conversely, "diaspora" suggests a long-term, usually voluntary, cultural project—a positionality in which one is at home in the globe and with which there exists a homeland-centeredness. Such a difference has far-reaching consequences for how communities are constituted, retain identity, and maintain connections to both sending and receiving societies.

This distinction revolves around Aihwa Ong's theory of flexible citizenship [13]. Ong posits that in a globalized world, people obtain citizenship and passports as forms of capital accumulation [13]. This ability allows elite transnational subjects to exploit more than one country of affiliation to their economic benefit by moving

freely across borders and retaining beneficial legal statuses in both countries. This freedom comes with the privilege of the elite diaspora, though. To the Fujianese illegal immigrant, citizenship is not negotiable but a constraint. Their movement is not a practice of cosmopolitan power but a dangerous gamble of great monetary and personal expense.

In this paper, the Ong framework is used to emphasize the inequality of mobility: as the diaspora crosses the borders, the illegal migrant crosses under them [13]. The diaspora member may hold passports from many countries, invest in real estate across many continents, and send his or her children to higher education institutions in other countries. The illegal immigrant, in turn, has no more worries about crossing state borders, is unable to use the formal banking infrastructure, or even to engage with the government. Such opposing mobilities create radically different worlds of sociality despite both groups being present in the same urban neighborhoods.

The Shadow Economy: Fujianese Smuggling Networks

The flow of illegal immigrants into China in the Fujian province exemplifies one of the most advanced yet high-stakes cases of human trafficking ever in contemporary history. In contrast to the heterogeneous origins of the greater diaspora, this is a highly local movement, centered mainly in the Fuzhou area and guided by a particular cultural logic in which labor abroad is a passageway to family progress. Concentration of such migration within specific counties and even villages forms dense kinship networks that allow and restrict the undocumented experience in America.

Economics of the Snakehead Trade

Transnational criminal networks called snakeheads facilitate the migration. The trip is not just a factual transfer but a monetary one that enslaves the migrant for years. It was estimated that between 50,000 and 100,000 Chinese nationals were smuggled into the U.S. in the 1990s and 1980s (Chin, 1999). The 1993 Golden Venture incident, where a cargo ship with 300 migrants ran aground off Queens, killing ten people, illustrated the scale and danger of these operations.

The economic cost of these migrants has rocketed. In the early 1990s, fees were about \$28,000, but by 2011, the price of smuggling services had increased to more than \$80,000 per person [18]. This is a debt typically secured by loan sharks or organized crime affiliates in the community, which, in fundamental ways, predetermines the post-migration experience. The illegal migrant is unable to assimilate or contribute to the open labor market; they are bound to the ethnic enclave economy, either in restaurants, garment factories, or construction, to pay the debt.

This establishes a sort of bondage labor in American soil, which is a terrible contrast to the vertical mobility of the legal diaspora. The average undocumented worker in Fujian may work 12-14-hour sessions, six or seven days a week, for years to pay off the smuggling debt. The cost of living is low—they may share cramped apartments with colleagues and remit back home on subsistence pay. The debt repayment period lasts 3-5 years on average, though it can be much longer if someone interrupts work or relocates to a new city to avoid immigration.

Community Isolation and Cultural Logic

This undocumented population is dependent on the so-called

closed kin relations and the Fuzhou dialect, forming a sub-community that is closed not even to the rest of the Chinese people [12]. This linguistic and lineal seclusion is a survival tactic. They are invisible to the outside world; inside the network, they are very monitored by the creditors who made their arrival possible. This dynamic disproves the myth of the model minority, revealing a layer of Asian Americans who exist in precarious conditions of working-class realities often overlooked by mainstream sociology.

In addition, the cultural rationality that led to this migration gives rise to intense social pressures. Migration has become so normalized in Fujianese sending communities that staying behind is stigmatized. Youths who fail to make attempts to migrate risk losing face and being seen as betraying their families. This cultural formation generates a self-perpetuating dynamic: successful migrants (or those who apply the label of successful migrants) motivate further migration, and shame of possible failure makes migrants unlikely to choose to go home even when immensely unhappy. The consequence is that the migration system is perpetuated not only through social necessity but also cultural expectations and economic calculation.

The Spiritual Anchor: Mazu and Religious Networks

The cult of Mazu, the Fujianese goddess of the sea, is one of the most intriguing points in the legal diaspora/illegal migrant intersections. Mazu provides a singular example of how religion promotes criminal undergrounds as well as state-approved diplomacy. The duality of the goddess demonstrates that cultural resources may be used in radically different ways by different social groups, yet retain common symbolic significance.

Mazu the Defender of the Smuggler

To the undocumented migrant, it is a journey to America that, like the old routes of their foremothers, is a sea voyage that seems as much an adventure as it is a voyage now. In history, the patron saint of sailors and fishermen, Mazu, provides spiritual protection for this risky route. Migrants frequently seek protection when travelling with snakeheads by praying to Mazu before the journey, visiting her temples in Fujian, or carrying small amulets with an image of Mazu. The deity of ancient traders and fishermen now watches over contemporary migrants, crowded into shipping containers or along dangerous overland paths.

The snakeheads themselves frequently donate toward Mazu shrines, justifying their felony business by donation to religion. The temples emerge as locations within the smuggling network, not necessarily as a result of overt coordination, but rather as the social networks and trust relationships they cultivate. The religious network offers, in this respect, the social capital needed to believe the smugglers, a vital factor when it comes to giving one's life and the financial future of their family to the criminal groups.

Mazu as Soft Power and Diasporic Glue

On the other hand, to the established diaspora and the Chinese state, Mazu is an instrument of soft power and cultural identity [15]. The Chinese government actively encourages Mazu worship to preserve connections with overseas Chinese and instead employs the goddess to evoke a sense of root-seeking. Fujian hosts state-sponsored Mazu festivals and temple refurbishments, which draw overseas Chinese visitors and offer opportunities for cultural exchange and business contacts. The state positions Mazu venera-

tion as an authentic Chinese cultural heritage that is worthy of preservation and glorification.

The same deity that a frightened stowaway implores in the hold of a freighter is the same deity that well-compensated Chinese American associations hail at the state's tribal festivals and in its high culture. In American Chinatowns, Mazu temples are community centers where traditional members of the diaspora convene to hold cultural events, language classes, and business networking. The goddess helps legal migrants connect transnationally so that they can still be culturally authentic, yet they are also a part of American society.

It proves that the two groups have different economic bases but share cultural assets whose exploitation serves different purposes: the first one is survival, the second one is heritage conservation [5, 10]. The irony is deep: it is this very religious infrastructure, which makes the illegal migration possible, that helps the Chinese state spread soft power influence over the communities of the diaspora. Mazu, in this way, demonstrates the way in which religion simultaneously functions at many levels: personal spiritual comfort, criminal infrastructure, and an instrument of state diplomacy.

Orientalism and the Spatial Reality of Chinatown

Whether the illegal migrant or the diasporic elite is legal or economically powerful, both forces have to manoeuvre through the landscape of America, which Orientalism historically informs. The basic formulation by Edward Said (1978) claims that Orientalism is a modality of thought that operates on an ontological and epistemological difference between the Occident and the Orient, as a Western corporate institution of domination, restructuring, and control of the Orient. Though Said used the Middle East as a central theme, this discourse of domination can be easily applied to the American context. John Kuo Wei Tchen interprets Chinatown not only as a neighborhood but also as a scarab of the American imagination, a repository of the Yellow Peril [17]. His discussion follows the process of American identity formation leading up to the physical appearance of Chinatown by tracing three intersecting Orientalisms: patrician (elite interest in Chinese aesthetics), commercial (commodification of Chinese exoticism), and political (exclusions and labor disputes).

The Containment Zone

Chinatown is a city within a city for undocumented Fujianese. It is among the few places where the Fuzhou dialect is practiced, where employers disregard undocumented status, and where it is possible to find a home without credit checks and background investigations. The thick social networks offer job referrals, emergency loans, and news on immigrant enhancement. The restaurants and garment shops in Chinatown provide work that needs no records and is paid in cash, allowing one to survive without regular economic infrastructures.

But this refuge is a trap. The patrician Orientalism, which has been identified by Tchen, makes these spaces exotic and other and establishes a psychological frontier that prevents the undocumented migrant from being pushed into mainstream American spaces [17]. They are literally in New York or San Francisco yet socially trapped in the Orient of the American imagination. The boundary is both real (immigration risk, community support) and imagined (Orientalist stereotyping marks Chinese as perpetually foreign).

Spatial confinement is replicated by what is economically necessary and socially organized. Illegal immigrants stay within their areas of employment to save money on commuting and reduce the risk of facing enforcement issues. The enclave is the center of social life, since here the person can use their dialect, enjoy their favorite foods, and communicate with others without the constant fear of being discovered. The outcome is some voluntary segregation fueled by precarity-Chinatown is both its haven and its jail.

The Tourist Spectacle

To the more affluent portion of the diaspora, however, Chinatown becomes more of a representation than a residence. Chinatown is transformed into a site of nostalgia or a business venture, a kind of commercial Orientalism, as upwardly mobile Chinese Americans migrate to the suburbs (the so-called ethnoburbs, as defined by Li, 1998), where ethnicity is produced as a commodity, serving as a tourist destination [8]. The exoticism of Chinatown is exploited by the Diaspora entrepreneurs who run restaurants, gift shops, and cultural sites to serve non-Chinese visitors who tend to appreciate Chinese culture.

This creates a tension in the neighborhood: The diaspora can afford the building in Chinatown and enjoy the exotic flair they cater to with tourists, whilst the illegal immigrants reside in the cellar of the building, working to pay off the debt that took them there. It is the spatial relation that enshrines class stratification: one group enjoys Orientalist commodification, while another does all the invisible labor to keep it in existence. The tourist who visits Chinatown to eat dim sum and to buy a souvenir in a gift shop has no idea about the illegal immigrants preparing food in restaurant kitchens or living in subdivided apartments above the shops. This invisibility is architectural, embedded in the very action of Chinatown as both tourist destination and working-class enclave.

Identity Formation: The Hyphen and the Homeland

The last difference between these forces is found in the creation of identification—namely, the method of traveling the Asian American identity as opposed to the Chinese National identity. Status determines which identities one can have, and which claims to belonging one can make.

The Burden of the "Hyphen"

Hyphenated identity (Asian American) is a place of negotiation [4]. The diaspora tends to interact with the hyphen actively. They can dismiss it to establish their indisputable membership in the Americas or adopt it as a political infrastructure uniting various Asian ethnic communities [3]. Their identity is movable—they can be both Chinese cultural ambassadors and American citizens. This flexibility is especially characteristic of such members of second-generation diasporas, who operate across cultural backgrounds, code-switch linguistically, and use both Chinese and American forms of social capital.

To the undocumented, the American side of the hyphen is unlawfully open. They are in a permanent state of transit. They are not yet Americans in law but cannot go back to China anymore without shame in failure or the pressure of debt. This marginal rank produces intense psychological tension. The illegal immigrant lives in a state of legal non-existence, neither fully a citizen of China (leaving and failing to attain any success) nor an Ameri-

can citizen (illegal status with respect to citizenship). The consequence is suspended identity, neither wholly here nor there, then always provisional with years or decades of living.

Digital Transnationalism

This is further complicated by technological improvements, especially applications such as WeChat. Through digital transnationalism, migrants can lead a mental life in China and a physical life in the US [16]. To the diaspora, this is a business and family networking tool, which allows them to sustain business ties in China as they establish careers in America. To the illegal migrant, it is a life raft that, ironically, foams against assimilation; by existing in an entirely Chinese-language digital space, the need to learn English or become part of the larger American social structure is reduced to further cement the enclave style of life. The migrant may be able to watch Chinese TV, read Chinese news, call family and friends in China, and conduct all their social and economic interactions on WeChat without learning English or building American social networks. This digital cocoon is comfortable and connective, but also replicates isolation, making the already complicated road to integration even more inclined.

Conclusion

The Chinese community in America is not a unit; it is a multi-layered stratification of legal statuses, economic statuses, and migration motives. In this paper, it has been established that the Chinese diaspora works through a logic of accumulation and cultural retention, whilst illegal migration, as in the Fujianese case, works through a logic of survival and debt redemption. These contrasting logics result in completely distinct relations to American society, citizenship, and belonging.

Despite these deep divisions, the two groups have been united by the cultural icon of Mazu and the geographical isolation of the Orientalist Chinatown. This goddess Mazu mediates the hazardous route of the undocumented and at the same time grounds the cultural identity of the formed citizen. In the same manner, Chinatown serves as a prison of debts to the newcomer and a museum of history to the assimilated. These common cultural and spatial resources operate differently across class lines and demonstrate how similarly different life paths can be realized through the same symbols and spaces.

Finally, to grasp Global Asias, it is crucial to leave the territories of the nation-state and consider the territory of the community. Boundaries not only between nations but also between legal statuses, economic classes, and levels of social mobility are the most important. The fact that the US immigration system is and will continue to be restrictive so long as there is economic disparity between the Global North and the South continues to be the defining conflict between the flexible citizen and the indebted migrant, characterizing the Chinese American experience.

By revealing the working-class realities and structural vulnerabilities concealed among aggregated statistics of Asian American success, this analysis challenges the model minority myth. It makes celebratory tales of transnationalism and the diaspora more complex by showing how global movement is highly uneven, affordable to a select few, and open to others only after risky, exploitative, and legally risky approaches.

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